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What Does It Take To Be A (Lesbian) Parent?
On Intent and Genetics
Sanja Zgonjanin*
I. INTRODUCTION
Is the woman who donated her eggs, which were fertilized in vitro and
implanted in her lesbian domestic partner, the legal mother of the children
born through this process?' KM v. E.G.2 is the first lesbian custody
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1. The invasive and time consuming process of oocyte or egg donation consists of
several steps: ovarian stimulation, monitoring and egg retrieval and fertilization. The egg
donor first takes the drug that reduces the release of hormones controlling the development
of the eggs in the ovary. Once the ovarian function is temporarily suspended, daily
hormone injections to stimulate ovarian follicles are administered for about two weeks.
This phase requires daily monitoring with blood hormone tests and vaginal ultrasounds.
When the ultrasound indicates the appropriate level of ovarian stimulation a hormone, called
human chorionic gonadotropin, is injected to help the eggs mature. The egg retrieval, which
lasts 15-30 minutes, takes place about 34-36 hours after the injection and upon
administration of an intravenous anesthetic. Eggs are then taken to the incubator where they
are inseminated. Embryos in excess of those needed for transfer are cryopreserved and may
be used at a later time in case the conception fails after the transfer or if more children are
wanted. The embryo transfer to the uterus is a brief procedure done three days after
retrieval. See Mayo Clinic, The IVF Process, at http://www.mayoclinic.org/ivf-
sct/process.htmi (last visited Feb. 9, 2005).
2. K.M. v. E.G., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 136 (Ct. App. 2004), cert. granted, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d
667 (2004). The case received media attention being the first to address the custody dispute
between the lesbian egg donor and gestational mother. See Bob Egelko, Birth Mom Wins
Custody Case: Prenatal Agreement Carries Weight, Appellate Court Says, S.F. CHRON.,
May 12, 2004, at B 1; Mary Vallis, Lesbian Egg Donor Is Denied Parental Rights: Signed a
Waiver.- California Ruling Seen As a Major Blow to Same-Sex Couples, NAT'L POST, May
13, 2004, at A16; Amanda Paulson, Modern Life Stretching Family Law, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Aug. 10, 2004, at 1; Maura Dolan, After Gay Parents Split Up, L.A. TIMES, July
22, 2004, at Al; Peggy Orenstein, The Other Mother, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2004, § 6, at 24.
However, neither the general press nor social science publications have paid much attention
to the legal or other aspects of lesbian parenthood such as genetic and gestational mothers.
There are no published statistics on egg donation in lesbian couples or on the number of
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dispute between an egg donor and a birth mother to reach the highest court
of any state. The case is extremely important because the California
Supreme Court decision will become a binding precedent for the
determination of legal parentage in lesbian couples consisting of genetic
and gestational mothers and will serve as a model to other states facing the
same issue. Unlike the most frequent scenario in a lesbian custody dispute,
where a lesbian who is artificially inseminated using a sperm donor and is a
legal mother by virtue of giving birth denies parental rights to her ex-
partner after the separation, KM v. E.G. involves a denial of parental
rights to a genetic mother by a non-genetic mother.3 To decide the dispute,
the court applied an intent-based parenting doctrine, a judicial device for
solving surrogacy cases. The intent to conceive and raise a child alone
should never be a dispositive factor in determining parentage because,
standing on its own, it makes no difference to the best interest of the child.4
By the early 1990s, the custody litigation between separated lesbian
partners who had jointly created families was already substantial. Lesbian
custody battles proved to be extremely difficult for both the courts and the
children born this way who may potentially face the hardship caused by the failure of the
legal system to recognize one of their parents. The rare piece on the subject of assisted
reproductive technologies entitled "18 Ways to Make a Baby" was broadcast by PBS on
October 9, 2001. See PBS NOVA, 18 Ways To Make a Baby,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/baby/ (last visited Mar, 1 2005) (featuring Dr. James Grifo,
the Director of Reproductive Endocrinology and Infertility at the New York University
School of Medicine and the pioneer of human nuclear transfer, who introduced the audience
to the numerous ways of conceiving a child using assisted reproductive technology
including: artificial insemination, at least ten types of in-vitro fertilization (IVF),
cytoplasmic transfer, nuclear transfer and cloning, assisted hatching, fragment removal, co-
culture, testicular sperm aspiration (TESA) and many others).
3. K.M, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3dat 139.
4. See Anthony Miller, Baseline, Bright-Line, Best Interests: A Pragmatic Approach
for California To Provide Certainty in Determining Parentage, 34 McGEORGE L. REv. 637,
710 (2003).
5. Nancy D. Polikoff, The Impact of Troxel v. Granville on Lesbian and Gay
Parents, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 825, 825-26 (2001) [hereinafter The Impact of Troxel]. See
Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood To Meet
the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEo. L.J.
459, 462-64 (1990) [hereinafter This Child Does Have Two Mothers] (citing Loftin v.
Flournoy, No. 569630-7 (Cal. Super. Ct., Alameda County., Jan. 2, 1985) the first decision
that addressed the issue of parenting where the lesbian couple separated. The case is
discussed in E. Donald Shapiro & Lisa Schultz, Single-Sex Families: The Impact of Birth
Innovations Upon Traditional Family Notions, 24 J. FAM. L. 271 (1986)). The court in
Loftin found that the partner of a "divorced" lesbian couple was the de facto parent and had
standing to seek visitation. The judge used the rationale of general custody law affording
custodial visitation rights to nonbiological persons. He said: "I've come to the conclusion
that simply because there is no specific statute or case that covers the situation, it does not
follow that there isn't a right that can be asserted by Miss. Loftin." E. Donald Shapiro &
Lisa Schultz, Single-Sex Families: The Impact of Birth Innovations Upon Traditional
Family Notions, 24 J. FAM. L. 271, 273 (1986). For a general historical overview of lesbian
and gay parent-child relationship case law development see David L. Chambers & Nancy D.
Polikoff, Family Law and Gay and Lesbian Family Issues in the Twentieth Century, 33
FAM. L.Q. 523, 532-542 (1999).
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litigants, given the nature of the legal framework within which they had to
operate. 6 The first hurdle for a nonlegal lesbian mother in a child custody
dispute is to establish legally recognized status as a parent in order to
satisfy the threshold issue of standing to petition for custody.7 The second
hurdle is to obtain parental rights equal to those already held by the legal
lesbian mother by proving that custody and visitation are in the best interest
of the child.8 The issue in most cases is whether a nonlegal lesbian parent
who has no genetic ties and has not given birth to the child can be a legal
mother. The courts have used various doctrines in order to grant or deny
the status of parent to a nonlegal lesbian mother who petitions for custody
and visitation. While the litigation involving lesbian legal and nonlegal
mothers arguably resulted in a small step away from biology as a
determining factor of parentage, 9 the compulsive nature of the law
continues to force lesbian mothers to assimilate with the heterosexual legal
regime if they wish to protect their parental rights. Professor Ruthann
Robson examines the process of assimilation as applied to lesbian
existence, finding that "[i]t is reciprocal because both sides participate, but
it is coercive because only the members of the disadvantaged group must
strive to meet the normative standards set by the dominant group, which
has the power and the ability to accept or reject members."10 This means
that a nonlegal lesbian parent will prevail in a child custody and visitation
dispute against the legal lesbian mother only if she proves that her conduct
successfully imitates the traditional parent-child relationship, and only if
the jurisdiction recognizes functional parenting. The courts have
developed an equitable principle of functional, de facto or psychological
parenthood to award custody to a child's non legal parent originally defined
in Holtzman v. Knott by a four prong test requiring that:
1. the legal parent fostered and consented to
development of a parent-like relationship between
the petitioner and the child;
6. See Paula L. Ettelbrick, Who is a Parent?: The Need to Develop a Lesbian
Conscious Family Law, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs. 513, 514-20 (1993) (arguing that
lesbian parenthood cannot be addressed by fitting it within the legal system based on
heterosexist structure, morality and presumptions).
7. Margaret S. Osborne, Legalizing Families: Solutions to Adjudicate Parentage for
Lesbian Co-Parents, 49 VILL. L. REv. 363, 377 (2004).
8. Id.
9. Ruthann Robson, Mostly Monogamous Moms?: An Essay on the Future of
Lesbian Legal Theories and Reforms, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs. 703, 707 (2000)
("Perhaps the revolutionary import of the lesbian nonlegal mother litigation is to dethrone
biology and crown 'reality' in parenting relations. Or perhaps not. Biology remains
primary.") [hereinafter Mostly Monogamous Moms].
10. Ruthann Robson, Assimilation, Marriage, and Lesbian Liberation, 75 TEMP. L.
REv. 709, 717 (2002) [hereinafter Assimilation].
Summer 2005] LESBIAN PARENT
2. the petitioner and child lived together in the same
household;
3. the petitioner assumed the obligations of parenthood
by taking responsibility for the child's care,
education, and development, including but not
limited to financial contribution, and did not expect
financial compensation;
4. the petitioner has been in a parent-like relationship a
sufficient amount of time to have a bonded
relationship."
A very small number of states recognize lesbian functional
parenthood.' 2  Most states adhere to the formal statutory definitions of
parent-excluding lesbian nonlegal mothers and denying them the
protection of the law.' 3  In the battle to gain parental rights for their
nonlegal lesbian mother clients, attorneys continue to use the existing law
without challenging the underlying concepts and assumptions inherent in
the heterosexual structure of society. 14  The need to challenge the
underlying principles of the current laws outweighs the need to fit the
nonlegal lesbian mother within the law in order to obtain parental rights for
any such client. By trying to fit the lesbian mother into the heterosexist
legal framework governing parenthood, courts and litigants alike continue
to promote a conservative approach to family issues which is removed from
reality and which perpetrates gender inequality and discrimination. Even
when a genetic relationship between the nonlegal lesbian parent and the
child exists, as in K.M v. E.G., the courts are unwilling to disturb the
heterosexual model, which allows for one mother only and favors the one
who gave birth regardless of her lack of genetic ties to the child. In order
to preserve the traditional family legal framework, judges impose
additional and extraneous standards on lesbian litigants, thus perpetuating
inequality between lesbian and non-lesbian parents.
11. Holtzman v. Knott, 533 N.W.2d 419, 435-36 (Wis. 1995). For a discussion of
functional parenting see Ruthann Robson, Making Mothers: Lesbian Legal Theory & the
Judicial Construction of Lesbian Mothers, 22 WOMEN's RTs. L. REP. 15, 23-30 (2000)
[hereinafter Making Mothers].
12. See infra note 28.
13. See NOLO, Same-Sex Parenting: When Adoption Isn't Possible, at
http://www.nolo.comllawcenter/ency/article.cfin/ObjectIDEE2DACEC-B377-4DE8-
B47557414FB9334C/catlD/56932A5A-84E0-4902-AO48DBF98CB9A78D (listing the
states where courts denied former same-sex partners visitation without considering the
relationship with children they raised together with their ex-partners: California, Florida,
Illinois and New York).
14. Ruthann Robson, Mother: The Legal Domestication of Lesbian Existence, in
ADvENTuREs IN LESBIAN PHILOSOPHY 186, 188 (Claudia Card, ed. 1994) [hereinafter
Mother].
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This case note will examine the intent-based parenthood doctrine used
by the California Court of Appeal in KM v. E.G. 5 and its application in
denying parental rights to a lesbian egg donor after she separated from her
partner. In the first part, this case note will provide the legal background
against which the lesbian custody and visitation cases operate. It will
present a general overview of the doctrines used to resolve the lesbian
parentage issues, focusing specifically on the current state of the law in
California. The second part will discuss KM v. E.G., including the issue
presented, the factual and procedural history, the rules and reasoning
applied by the court and the policy behind the rules. The third part of this
note will critique the case, focusing particularly on the court's
inappropriate use of the intent standard in deciding between two equal
statutory claims. Finally, the conclusion will argue that there can be no
equality for lesbian parents without challenges to the underlying concepts
of the laws governing parentage and to the judicial devices that support
unequal treatment of lesbians. By adopting imposed legal norms rather
than challenging unfair and discriminatory treatment by the existing legal
system, lesbian litigants sustain the status quo of inequality.
II. LEGAL REALITY FACED BY THE LESBIAN EGG DONOR
FIGHTING FOR HER CHILDREN
The statutory definition of a parent is based on the traditional belief
that a child can have only "one mother and one father, neither more nor
less. ,16 Accordingly, the mother and father are the only persons whose
parental rights and responsibilities are legally recognized. These
underlying premises of legal parenthood are inconsistent with reality today
because they exclude millions of nontraditional families.' 7  Lesbian
parenting is especially vulnerable because it destabilizes the hegemony of
the heterosexual dichotomy. Application of the male-female schema to the
female-female based family results in tension and inconsistency in the law.
Since the category of mother is legally reserved for only one person, by
biology or adoption, the other lesbian in an intra-lesbian child dispute is
automatically relegated to the category of a third-party outsider that
includes the lesbian nonlegal mother, the sperm donor, grandparents and
other relatives.'
8
15. K.M, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 139.
16. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers, supra note 5 at 468.
17. See generally Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood As an Exclusive
Status: The Need for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has
Failed, 70 VA. L. REv. 879 (1984) (suggesting nonexclusive parenthood as an alternative
approach to child custody disputes in which the courts should focus on the child's welfare
rather than the parent's rights and allow for alternative arrangements to accommodate the
variety of situations that fall outside of the nuclear family such as the case of stepparents,
psychological parents and unwed fathers).
18. Ruthann Robson, Third Parties and the Third Sex: Child Custody and Lesbian
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The courts have applied different theories in deciding child custody
disputes between lesbians. Four main doctrines exist by which a nonlegal
lesbian may acquire a legal status as a parent: equitable estoppel (used to
require the legally unrecognized parent to pay child support or to maintain
an ongoing parent-child relationship);' 9 de facto or psychological
parenthood (allows a person to seek visitation rights based on the
psychological bond with a child);20 in loco parentis (similar to de facto
parenthood, recognizes the parental rights of a person who voluntarily
provides financial support or assumes custodial duties);21 and second-
parent adoption (nonbiological mother adopts the biological mother's child
without the need for the latter to relinquish her parental rights).22 Although
useful in affording parental rights to the nonlegal lesbian parent where no
statutory rights exist, these doctrines have been regarded as problematic by
some scholars.23
Professor Robson is especially critical of the functionalist approach
embodied in the de facto parenting concept, which she claims sustains "the
dyadic nature of parenthood" 24 and reinforces the economic stratification
model of society.25 The most significant drawback of the functionalist
approach is the unequal treatment of a nonlegal lesbian parent. Unlike a
man who acquires fatherhood by marriage to a child's mother, or a
biological father who has no connection to the child, the lesbian nonlegal
parent is required to prove that her parent-like relationship with a child is
sufficient to deem her a parent.26 Additionally, de facto parenting depends
on the consent of a legal parent to the nonlegal lesbian parent's relationship
with the child, therefore favoring biology and using it as legitimate grounds
27for discrimination. However, the doctrines listed above are not available
Legal Theory, 26 CONN. L. REV. 1377, 1377-78 (1994) [hereinafter Third Parties and the
Third Sex].
19. See Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers, supra note 5 at 491.
20. Id. at 510.
21. Id. at 502.
22. Id. at 522.
23. See Robson, Mother, supra note 14 at 196 (arguing that the legal regime
domesticates lesbians when lesbians use the law against each other, sustaining the
oppressive power of the law). See also Martha L. Minow, Redefining Families: Who's In
and Who's Out?, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 269, 276-78 (1991) (discussing problems with the
functional approach such as the unpredictability of judicial decisions, the manipulation of
the functional test to obtain family status benefits without taking obligations, historical use
of functionalism by those who are not sensitive to cultural diversity and the inconsistency
that the case law would produce); Julie Shapiro, A Lesbian-Centered Critique of Second-
Parent Adoptions, 14 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 17 (1999) (critiquing strategies designed to
achieve a short term survival by denying lesbian identity and dividing lesbian community
and pointing out the failure of second-parent adoption to challenge the notion that a child
can have only two legal parents).
24. Robson, Third Parties and the Third Sex, supra note 18 at 1400.
25. Id. at 1401.
26. Robson, Assimilation, supra note 10 at 807.
27. Id. at 810.
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in every state28 and the lesbian nonlegal parent is often left with a formalist,
statutory approach, as in the 1991 New York case of Alison D. v. Virginia
M 29 In that case the highest court of New York State refused to apply de
facto or in loco parentis doctrines and held that, despite her relationship
with her partner's child, Alison was not a parent for the purposes of the
statute and had no standing to seek custody or visitation.30
That same year, the California Court of Appeal decided Nancy S. v.
Michele G.31 The California court upheld the finding that a lesbian partner
who was not a natural or adoptive parent had no standing to seek custody.32
The court adhered to the strict interpretation of the statute, rejecting the
doctrines of de facto parenthood, in loco parentis, equitable estoppel and
the functional approach.33 Unlike New York and California, some states
have recognized de facto parenting in lesbian custody cases, including:
New Jersey,34  Wisconsin,35  Maine,36  Washington,37  Massachusetts,38
Pennsylvania, 39 Colorado, 40 New Mexico 41 and Rhode Island.42  The
28. See infra notes 34-42 (states that as of 2004 recognize de facto parenting in
lesbian custody cases: New Jersey, Wisconsin, Maine, Washington, Pennsylvania,
Colorado, New Mexico and Rhode Island). See also Human Rights Campaign, Second-
Parent/Stepparent Adoption Laws in the U.S., at
http://www.hrc.org/Template.cfin?Section=YourCommunity&Template=/ContentManage
ment/ContentDisplay.cfn&ContentlD=13383 (current as of 2004 listing of states that allow
same sex second-parent adoption by law or court decision: California, Connecticut, Illinois,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Vermont and District of Columbia;
states where second-parent adoption is available in some jurisdictions: Alabama, Alaska,
Delaware, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Nevada, New Mexico,
Oregon, Rhode Island, Texas, Washington; states with court rulings that prohibits same sex
second parent adoption: Colorado, Nebraska, Ohio, Wisconsin).
29. For a discussion of a formalistic approach to the Alison D. case see Ruthann
Robson, Making Mothers, supra note 11 at 24-27. See also Ettelbrick, supra note 6 at 522-
32.
30. Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 29 (N.Y. 1991).
31. Nancy S. v. Michele G., 228 Cal. App. 3d 831 (1991).
32. Id. at 836.
33. id. at 836-41.
34. V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539 (N.J. 2000) (holding that a person who acted as a
parent for a long time is a psychological parent).
35. Holtzman v. Knott, 533 N.W.2d 419, 431 (Wis. 1995) (holding that the trial court
had equitable authority to award visitation rights to a person who established a parent-like
relationship with a child).
36. C.E.W. v. D.E.W., 845 A.2d 1146, 1151 (Me. 2004) (holding that a lesbian
partner was a de facto parent entitled to parental rights and responsibilities based upon
determination of the best interest of the child).
37. In re Parentage of L.B., 89 P.3d 271 (Wash. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004) (holding that
a parent who proved the existence of de facto parent-child relationship could petition for
shared parentage or visitation).
38. E.N.O. v. L.M.M, 711 N.E.2d 886 (Mass. 1999) (holding that a person who lived
with a child and participated in the child's life with the consent of a legal parent sharing all
parental functions was de facto parent and had standing to seek visitation which was found
to be in the best interest of the child).
39. T.B. v. L.R.M., 786 A.2d 913 (Pa. 2001) (holding that a lesbian partner had
standing under in loco parentis doctrine where the partners jointly decided to conceive and
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Washington Court of Appeals in In re Parentage of L.B. acknowledged that
[t]he recognition of de facto parents is in accord with notions of the
modem family. An increasing number of same gender couples,
like the plaintiff and the defendant, are deciding to have children.
It is to be expected that children of nontraditional families, like
other children, form parental relationships with both parents,
whether those parents are legal or de facto.4 3
Many courts, however, continue to adhere to the legal construction of
motherhood and fatherhood based on the explicit or tacit assumptions of
natural law, which posit the normative model of a nuclear family as
consisting of biological mother and financially providing father. 4
Likewise, most of the statutes embody the traditional nuclear family
concept and continue to discriminate on the basis of gender, consequently
granting parental rights to men who assume the role of a parent while
denying them to women who assume the same role.45 Ironically, California
permits joint and second parent adoption for same-sex couples but retains a
statutory model based on biology and the traditional nuclear family.
The California statutory scheme for the determination of parentage is
outdated and does not address many issues related to parentage in cases of
assisted reproduction.46 California adopted the Uniform Parentage Act
(hereinafter UPA), codifying it as part of family law in 1975. Since then
the UPA was amended in 200247 to include assisted reproduction and
parent the child).
40. In the Interest of E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d 546 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004) (granting joint
custody to a lesbian partner based on the psychological parent doctrine).
41. A.C. v. C.B., 829 P.2d 660 (N.M. App. 1992) (holding that a lesbian partner who
had a written agreement but was denied continuing the child had standing).
42. Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959 (R.I. 2000) (holding that the agreement
between the biological mother and former same-sex partner to allow visitation was
enforceable).
43. In re Parentage of L.B., 89 P.3d at 284.
44. Susan E. Dalton, From Presumed Fathers to Lesbian Mothers: Sex
Discrimination and the Legal Construction of Parenthood, 9 MIcH. J. GENDER & L. 261,
323 (2003).
45. Id. at 319.
46. Miller, supra note 4, at 640.
47. UNIF. PARENTAGE AcT (amended 2002), available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bllIulc/upa/finalOO.htm (last accessed April 6, 2005)
The amended or revised Act includes under Definitions § 102 (4):
'Assisted reproduction' means a method of causing pregnancy other than sexual
intercourse. The term includes:
(A) intrauterine insemination;
(B) donation of eggs;
(C) donation of embryos;
(D) in-vitro fertilization and transfer of embryos; and
(E) intracytoplasmic sperm injection.
Although the revision included assisted reproduction (Article 7) and gestational agreements
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though approved by the American Bar Association in 2003, only four states
have adopted the revised version: Delaware, Texas, Washington and
Wyoming.a8 The main purpose of the UPA was "to eliminate the legal
distinction between legitimate and illegitimate children. ' 49 The UPA
creates three classes of parents: mothers,5° fathers who are presumed
fathers,5' and fathers who are not presumed fathers.52 The only section
pertaining to assisted reproduction is found in Family Code § 7613, which
provides that a husband who consents to his wife's artificial insemination
under the supervision of a physician is treated in law as the natural father.53
There is no provision pertaining to women involved in assisted
reproduction or unmarried persons in general. The statute provides three
methods of proving a parent-child relationship: natural mother by birth,
natural father by rebuttable presumption5 4 and adoptive parent proved by
adoption. 5 The statute lacks a provision about ovum donation and in vitro
(Article 8), it failed to recognize lesbian parentage. Section 702 states: "A donor is not a
parent of a child conceived by means of assisted reproduction." The accompanying
Comment to § 702 states:
If a child is conceived as the result of assisted reproduction, this section clarifies
that a donor (whether of sperm or egg) is not a parent of the resulting child. The
donor can neither sue to establish parental rights, nor be sued and required to
support the resulting child. In sum, donors are eliminated from the parental
equation.
However, Article 8 recognized "intended parent" as a legal parent in surrogacy agreements
only. Thus, § 201 provides the following ways to establish mother-child relationship:
(1) the woman's having given birth to the child, [except as otherwise provided in
[Article] 8];
(2) an adjudication of the woman's maternity; [or]
(3) adoption of the child by the woman; [or]
(4) an adjudication confirming the woman as a parent of a child born to a
gestational mother if the agreement was validated under [Article] 8 or is
enforceable under other law.
48. Uniform Family Law Acts Update, (Oct. 2003), available at
http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/newsletters/FamilyLawPrintOctO3.pdf ("UPA has been
adopted in Delaware, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming, and at least 8 more introductions
are planned for 2004.").
49. Johnson v. Calvert, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 494, 497 (Cal. 1993).
50. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7610(a) (West 2004).
51. Id. § 7611.
52. Id. § 7611.5.
53. Id. § 7613(a).
54. See Miller, supra note 4, at 685. Miller notes that California is the only state that
maintains the conclusive presumption of paternity, namely that when the married woman
has a child, her husband is presumed to be the father if she lived with him at the time of the
conception. The constitutionality of the fatherhood presumption was upheld by the
Supreme Court in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989). In that case the genetic
father failed to rebut the presumption by the motion for blood test which could only be done
by husband or wife when the natural father filed a paternity acknowledgment within two
years of the child's birth. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 115. California legislature subsequently
revised the statute to allow the presumed father to rebut the presumption. CAL. FAM. CODE
§ 7541(b) (West 2004).
55. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7610(c) (West 2004).
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fertilization comparable to Family Code § 7613 (d), which severs the
parental rights of a sperm donor. 6
Under the UPA, a woman can prove that she is a natural mother by
giving birth to the child or through a blood test establishing genetic
consanguinity.57 Assisted reproduction technology makes it possible for a
child to have more than one mother who will fit the UPA definition of a
natural mother. However, California law recognizes only one natural
mother.58
The highest court in California resolved the issue of two natural
mothers in Johnson v. Calvert by applying the intent doctrine of
parenthood.59 In Johnson, a married couple, Crispina and Mark Calvert,
sought a declaration that they were the natural parents of the unborn
child. 60 The couple contracted with a gestational surrogate, Anna Johnson,
to carry the baby created by in vitro fertilization with Crispina's fertilized
egg.61 When the relationship between the couple and Anna deteriorated,
Anna changed her mind and decided to keep the baby.62 The court held
that where the UPA recognizes giving birth and genetic consanguinity as
methods of establishing a mother-child relationship, and where the methods
do not coincide in one woman, the one who "intended to procreate the child
- that is, shewho intended to bring about the birth of a child that she
intended to raise as her own - is the natural mother under California
law. 63 Because each woman had valid proof of maternity, the court turned
to the intent of the surrogacy agreement. 64
Without discussing the general difficulty of determining intent, the
court turned to the "but for" test, using the intent at the child's conception
as a fixed measure against which everything else had to be balanced: "They
affirmatively intended the birth of the child, and took the steps necessary to
affect in vitro fertilization. But for their acted-on-intention, the child would
not exist. '65 The court rejected the best interest of the child standard as
inapplicable in the case of parentage determination.66 Instead, it found
support for its intent-based approach in legal scholarship that promotes the
56. See Miller, supra note 4, at 668 (citing the only five states with statutory
provisions that address the issue of egg donation and in vitro fertilization: Florida, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, Texas and Virginia).
57. Johnson, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 496-497.
58. Id. at 499 n.8 (declining to accept the ACLU invitation to find that the child had
two mothers because recognizing parental rights of the third party would diminish the role
of the legally recognized mother).
59. Id. at 500.
60. Id. at 496.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Johnson, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 500.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 500 n. O.
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intention of those who are creators and originators of the procreative
relationship as dispositive in awarding parental rights.67 In rejecting the
best interest of the child standard, the majority considered parentage and
custody as two separate concepts and concluded, "[1]ogically, the
determination of parentage must precede and should not be dictated by,
eventual custody decisions." 68 However, the court did not demonstrate the
logic of strict separation between parentage and custody issues, given the
co-existing and interdependent relation between the two.
Dissenting Justice Kennard rejected intent as a determinative factor
and instead argued that both the woman who gave birth and the woman
who provided the ovum had a strong claim to legal motherhood.69 Justice
Kennard argued for the application of the best interest of the child standard
as the most protective of the child's welfare. 70  The dissenting opinion
included a careful description of the egg retrieval method, which
emphasized the emotional and physical burden on a woman undergoing
this procedure. 71  The dissent criticized the majority's use of intent to
resolve the parentage dispute because the concept of intent derives from the
principles of tort, intellectual property and commercial contract law.72
Justice Kennard stated that the major problem with the inflexible intent rule
was that its application will not serve the best interest of the child in every
case. 73
Some saw the decision as groundbreaking,74  and one author
optimistically noted that the Johnson decision opened a possibility for both
women in a lesbian couple to be determined mothers.75 Others criticized
the decision, 76 pointing out that maternity as defined by the Johnson court
67. Id. at 500-01 (citing three articles to justify the intent based approach to the
determination of motherhood: John Lawrence Hill, What Does it Mean to Be a "Parent"?:
The Claims of Biology As the Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353 (1991);
Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood: An
Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 Wis. L. REv. 297 (1990); Andrea E. Stumpf,
Redefining Mother: A Legal Matrix for New Reproductive Technologies, 96 YALE L.J. 187
(1986)).
68. Id. at 500.
69. Johnson, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 506 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 508.
72. Id. at 517.
73. Id. at 516.
74. Changing Realities of Parenthood: The Law's Response to the Evolving
American Family and Emerging Reproductive Technologies, 116 HARV. L. REv. 2052, 2071
(2003).
75. Ryiah Lilith, The G.I.F.T. of Two Biological and Legal Mothers, 9 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 207, 221 (2001).
76. Janet L. Dolgin, The "Intent" of Reproduction: Reproductive Technologies and
the Parent-Child Bond, 26 CONN. L. REv. 1261, 1281 n.63 (1994) (examining Johnson,
Dolgin noted the class and race issues that were present citing Don J. DeBenedictis,
Surrogacy Contract Enforced, 77-JAN. A.B.A. J. 32, 33 (1991) which described Anna as
part Black, part Native American, part Irish and a welfare recipient).
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is very fragile. 7 The underlying contradiction of identifying motherhood
by nature, which excludes intent, compared with identifying motherhood
by contractual choice, which is based on intent, remained unresolved by the
court. 78 The majority's decision to use intent as a tie-breaker where two
mothers' interests compete and to ignore the best-interest-of-the-child
standard also remains problematic. 79  The question that remained
unanswered by Johnson is whether the intent rule should be applied in all
other cases of assisted reproduction, including those between lesbian co-
parents.80
III. GENETIC MOTHER V. GESTATIONAL MOTHER
K.M. and E.G. started an intimate relationship in June 1993 and
registered as a domestic partnership in San Francisco in October 1994. 8I
After telling K.M. about her desire to become a parent, E.G. attempted
artificial insemination but was unsuccessful because she was unable to
produce enough eggs to become pregnant. 82 At the suggestion of her
doctor, E.G. agreed to in vitro fertilization with K.M.'s eggs, provided that
she would be the only mother because she did not want custody battles in
the future.83 E.G. stated she would consider adoption by K.M. but not for
at least five years. She believed that after five years, the relationship would
seem more permanent.84 K.M. agreed and in March 1995 started the egg
retrieval procedure, after signing the ovum donor consent form.
8 5
E.G. gave birth to twin girls on December 7, 1995, and asked K.M. to
marry her shortly thereafter.86 For the next five years, E.G., K.M. and the
twins lived together as a family.87 Neither E.G. nor K.M. disclosed to
anyone that K.M. was the genetic mother.88 In 1998 the couple started
arguing about whether to tell the twins they were genetically related to
K.M. 89 K.M. insisted on adoption but E.G. was reluctant. 90 In March of
2001 the couple separated, and K.M. filed a petition to establish a parental
relationship. 9' She dismissed the petition after a short reconciliation but
77. Id. at 1295.
78. Id. at 1289.
79. Miller, supra note 4, at 663.
80. Id. at 665.
81. K.M, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d at 139.
82. Id. at 140.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 140-41.
86. Id. at 141.
87. K.M., 13 Cal.Rptr.3d at 141.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. ld.
91. Id. at 142.
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filed a new one in February 2002 seeking joint custody.92 The trial court
found that K.M. was not a legal parent because she relinquished her
parental rights when she signed the ovum donor consent form.
9 3
Additionally, the trial court held that the parties' oral agreement that E.G.
be the sole parent was not changed by their subsequent conduct.94 Because
K.M. was not a legal parent and consequently lacked standing to seek
custody and visitation rights, the trial court granted E.G.'s motion to quash
and dismiss the petition.
95
The issue on appeal was whether K.M. qualified as a parent and was
entitled to custody and visitation. The court applied the intent test
articulated in Johnson. It found that K.M. had standing under the UPA
because her genetic consanguinity qualified her as an interested party who
can bring an action to determine a mother-child relationship.96 However,
the court affirmed the trial court's ruling that E.G. was the only legally
recognized parent under the UPA.9 7 In discussing the parties' parentage
intentions the court considered three factors: the oral agreement between
the parties that E.G. would be the only parent; 98 the ovum donor consent
form containing the waiver of the donor's parental rights;99 and the parties'
relationship at the time of conception. 100 Although the court recognized
that the determination of parentage does not depend on the existence of a
binding contract, it found the oral agreement significant to the extent that it
evidenced an intention that E.G. would be the only parent until the
adoption by K.M.' 0 The court then analogized the ovum donor form with
a sperm donor form, finding express intent by K.M. to be only the donor
and not the parent of any child created from her eggs. 0 2 Finally, while
recognizing the legal distinction between a mere egg donor and an
intending parent, and acknowledging the evidence was conflicting on
whether the parties intended joint parenthood or wanted to raise the child
solely as E.G.'s child, the court affirmed the trial court's finding that at the
time of conception it was E.G. who affirmatively intended to be the mother
92. Id.
93. K.M, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d at 143.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 144 (quoting Johnson:
The parent and child relationship for the "natural mother" may be established "by proof
of her having given birth to the child, or under [the UPA]." (Fam.Code. § 7610, subd. (a).)
the California Supreme Court has rejected the notion that only the woman who gives birth to
a child qualifies as the "natural" mother: "The disjunctive 'or' indicates that blood test
evidence [reflecting genetic consanguinity], as prescribed in the Act, constitutes an
alternative to proof of having given birth." (Johnson, at 92)).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 146-47.
99. KM., 13 Cal.Rptr.3d at 147-48.
100. Id. at 148-50.
101. Id. at 146.
102. Id. at 148.
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of the child. l 3
The next step in the court's deliberation was to examine the parties'
conduct subsequent to the birth of the child. The court refused to apply a
statutory presumption of parentage on the grounds that K.M.'s genetic
consanguinity was not disputed. 1 4 It rejected the concept of the functional
parent based on the rationale that functioning as a parent does not confer
legal parental rights.105 It also rejected the doctrine of equitable estoppel
citing the policy concerns in Nancy S. v. Michele G. that granting equitable
estoppel would expose other natural parents to legal action by long term
child-care providers, relatives, successive stepparents or other close family
friends. 10 6 The court finally refused to apply the best interest of the child
standard, confirming the Johnson limitation of that standard only to
custody and visitation cases and not to determination of parentage.'0 7 The
trial court's judgment was affirmed. 0 8 Two judges concurred without
publishing a separate opinion.'
9
IV. WHAT WENT WRONG IN THE COURT OF APPEAL?
The original Court of Appeal's opinion in K.M v. E.G., 10 decided on
May 10, 2004, was modified on June 9, 2004, when the petition for
rehearing was denied without a change in the judgment."' The
modification consisted of twenty-nine changes deleting the word "legal" in
"legal parent," so that, for example, the phrase "only legal mother" was
changed to "only mother." The language of the opinion now reads:
"Eventually, however, E.G. asked K.M. to donate her eggs, provided that
K.M. would be a 'real donor' and E.G. would be the only mother." 112 The
second sentence of the opinion, which used to read, "The couple orally
agreed that only E.G. would be the legal parent unless and until there was a
formal adoption,"'' 3 now reads: "The couple orally agreed that E.G. would
be the only parent unless and until there was a formal adoption."
'
"
14
No one would doubt that there is a fundamental difference between an
agreement of two parties that only one would be the legal parent until
formal adoption by the other and an agreement that one would be the only
103. Id. at 149.
104. Id. at 152.
105 K.M, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d at 152.
106. Id. at 153 (quoting Nancy S. v. Michele G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212, 219 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1991)).
107. Id. at 154.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. K.M. v. E.G., 118 Cal. App. 4th 477 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
111. K.M. v. E.G., No. A101754, 2004 Cal. App. LEXIS 873 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 1,
2004).
112. Id. at *1.
113. K.M, 118 Cal. App. 4th at 481.
114. K.M, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3dat 139.
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parent until formal adoption. The attribute "only" is exclusionary; it
presumes "the only parent" to mean the sole parent without any possibility
of the other person having the same role. On the other hand, the qualifier
"legal" is a classifying attribute rather than an exclusionary one and does
not seem to preclude the collateral existence of other forms of parentage.
For example, being a legal parent of a child does not prevent the existence
of a stepparent 15 or foster parent 16 at the same time. The modified
statement of the agreement that E.G. would be the "only parent" is more
difficult to challenge than the statement that E.G. would be the "legal
parent." The court seemed to have decided at the outset that E.G. would
prevail, because when it changed "legal parent" to "only parent" it failed to
address the apparent contradiction of a mother who intended to be the only
parent nonetheless allowing the other party to assume parental duties and
responsibilities for six years. In an example of a similar modification,
"sole legal parent" was changed to "sole parent" in the following phrase:
"First, K.M. orally agreed before the children were conceived that E.G.
would be the sole parent unless and until the parties underwent formal
adoption proceedings." ' 1 7  Other changes include the replacement of
"natural motherhood" with "parenthood" ' 18 and "second legal parent" with
"second parent."'"19
Two more changes were detrimental to K.M.'s case. First, in the
sentence, "[t]hat evidence showed that the parties intended to maintain their
relationship into the future and, at least implicitly, planned to raise together
any child formed from K.M.'s donated eggs," the court modified "raise
together" to read "provide a home together."' 120  The court will use this
change to support its finding that K.M. did not intend to raise the children
but only to donate her eggs and "facilitate the procreation of a child for
E.G.'' Second: "E.G.'s testimony that K.M. orally agreed to E.G.'s sole
parenthood was confirmed by the conduct of both parties after the birth of
the children in keeping K.M.'s genetic connection secret for years." The
court added to this sentence the following: "Moreover, after the children
grew older, K.M.'s assertions that she wanted to adopt them constituted an
implied concession that until adoption E.G. was the only parent."' 122 This
added sentence reflects the same contradiction mentioned above between
115. The terms are defined as follows: "stepfather. The husband of one's mother by a
later marriage." and "stepmother. The wife of one's father by a later marriage." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1425 (7th ed. 1999).
116. Id. at 1137 (defining "foster parent. An adult who, though Without blood ties or
legal ties, cares for and rears a child, esp. an orphaned or neglected child that might
otherwise be deprived of nurture.").
117. K.M, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3dat 145.
118. K.M, No. A101754, 2004 Cal. App. LEXIS 873 at *3.
119. Id. at *7-8.
120. Id. at *6.
121. K.M, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 149.
122. K.M, No. A101754, 2004 Cal. App. LEXIS 873 at *7.
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the intention to be the only parent and conduct permitting the other party to
assume the role of the parent for years. However, the court refused to
discuss the parties' conduct or circumstances after the birth of the
children.
123
The negative effect that these changes will have on K.M. is evident.
Interestingly, K.M.'s counsel barely mentions this detrimental change that
affected their client in the Appellant's Petition for Review. 24 Perhaps they
did this because they also put forward the fact that Assembly Bill 205,
which went into effect in January 2005, would provide that "[t]he rights
and obligations of registered domestic partners with respect to a child of
either of them shall be the same as those of spouses.' 25 Although Bill 205
is not retroactive, the legislative purpose behind its enactment is clearly the
elimination of discrimination and discriminatory effects that many current
laws have on lesbians, gays and bisexuals. 126 However, here as in many
other litigations concerning lesbian parental rights, the immediate goal of
providing desired relief to a client is paramount and the means used to
achieve it cannot fall outside of the dominant legal framework. 127 In order
to succeed in their claim, lesbians are compelled to use legal strategies and
tools familiar to judges but not designed for lesbians. They are expected to
adjust their claims to a legal framework that does not recognize lesbians.
They are compelled to adopt the concepts governing the existing legal
framework even if those concepts are inapplicable to lesbian existence. To
123. K.M, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 151 (dismissing entirely the parties' conduct and the
development of the relationship between the parties and between the parties and their
children. In a two-sentence paragraph entitled "IV. Effect of the Parties' Subsequent
Conduct," the court, without providing any justification or adequate reasoning, stated:
"K.M. has suggested that we should alternatively consider circumstances occurring after
birth of the child, namely, the parties 'social, psychological and functional parental
relationships' with the child and the best interest of the child. We cannot agree.")
124. See K.M. v. E.G., No. S125643, 2004 WL 2108127, at *12 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept.
1, 2004) (citing the language from the original opinion that "the parties planned to raise
together any child formed from K.M.'s donated eggs.")
125. Id. at *6 (citing CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5(d) (West 2004)).
126. The Bill states:
The Legislature hereby finds and declares that despite longstanding social and
economic discrimination, many lesbian, gay, and bisexual Californians have
formed lasting, committed, and caring relationships with persons of the same sex.
These couples share lives together, participate in their communities together, and
many raise children and care for other dependent family members together. Many
of these couples have sought to protect each other and their family members by
registering as domestic partners with the State of California and, as a result, have
received certain basic legal rights. Expanding the rights and creating
responsibilities of registered domestic partners would further California's interests
in promoting family relationships and protecting family members during life
crises, and would reduce discrimination on the bases of sex and sexual orientation
in a manner consistent with the requirements of the California Constitution.
A.B. 205, 2003-2004 (Cal. 2003-04).
127. See Shapiro, supra note 23, at 18 (arguing that "strategies aimed at short-term
survival rely on the denial of lesbian identity.").
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secure their basic rights, lesbian parents need to fit into traditional
categories of the hetero-normative structure. It is not sufficient that a
genetic mother satisfies the statutory requirement for parental status; she
has to do more. 128 Unlike a sperm donor, who would be entitled to the
status of father in a custody dispute with a lesbian birth mother, 129 a lesbian
egg donor must resort to proving that she qualifies as the "presumed
father."' 3°  To prevail, lesbians are willing to adopt nonlesbian legal
categories, thereby sustaining their inequality and confirming the validity
of the existing judicial practices.
The uncritical adoption of the rules of law and its manipulation through
litigation strategy to achieve a favorable result in a particular case is
criticized by Professor Robson. She asserts that lesbians are
domesticated' 3' by law when they internalize the legal regime of the
dominant culture without challenging its underlying notions.'32 Robson
concludes: "If we are ever to move beyond our domestication and ensure
lesbian survival on lesbian terms, we must theorize against the dominant
discourse of the legal regime, including the legal regime that codifies the
category mother."'
33
A. IMPOSING THE STANDARD
The decision of the appellate court in KM suffers from many flaws.
The biggest one is the imposition of an unjustified and unnecessary
additional standard on a parent who qualifies as a natural mother under the
UPA to petition for custody and visitation. 34 Another problem with the
opinion is that the court does not explain why it applied the Johnson intent
test in the case of an egg donor who was the genetic mother of the children
and who had an established parent-child relationship with them for the first
six years of their lives. Other than stating "[b]ecause we believe that the
'intention' test set out in Johnson v. Calvert ... governs,', 135 the court does
not even hint at why it thinks this rule, formulated to address the surrogacy
case, applies to a lesbian genetic mother who developed a parent-child
128. K.M, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 144-45.
129. Robson, Mother, supra note 14, at 192.
130. K.M, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3dat 151-52.
131. Robson defines "domestication":
The law can interfere with both the tangible and intangible types of survival in
many ways, one of which is a process I call domestication. Domestication is
similar to other political processes that have been named colonization and
imperialism. Yet both imperialism and colonization describe concrete historical
processes that have resulted in slavery, death, and destruction, and I have come to
prefer the term 'domestication' to connote the law's hegemony over lesbian
survival. Domestication is connotatively gendered.
Robson, Mother, supra note 14, at 186.
132. Id. at 186-87.
133. Id. at 197.
134. K.M, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 143-44.
135. Id. at 139.
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relationship with the children for six years while living with them. This is
not surprising given that the court in Johnson never explicitly said why it
used that test. 36 Even the language announcing the test is similar to the
Johnson opinion: "[b]ecause two women each have presented acceptable
proof of maternity, we do not believe this case can be decided without
enquiring into the parties' intentions as manifested in the surrogacy
agreement."' 3 7  The only similarity between Johnson and KM is the
presence of a genetic and gestational mother. The factual background and
surrounding circumstances are entirely different, making it more difficult to
understand why the surrogacy case standard was applied to a non-
surrogacy situation. The K.M court fails to address the crucial distinction
between the parentage dispute in Johnson and the one in KM, namely the
different number and nature of interested parties: three in Johnson
involving the "third party" and two in K.M not involving the "third party."
As the word indicates, the third party doctrine developed as a way to
preserve the traditional heterosexual family model of two parents, one
mother and one father, thus keeping any third party out of this model.
38
The third party doctrine operated in the Johnson surrogacy case,
eliminating the third party surrogate in favor of the husband and wife, to
preserve the father and mother heterosexual dyad.
Although the California statute is silent on surrogate motherhood, the
courts generally endorse gestational surrogacy.139 Rather than enforcing
the surrogacy contract, the court in Johnson opened the door to confusion
and subsequent misapplications of the intent test. It seemed that the
Johnson court replaced biology with intent as a ground for maternity.
Actually, the court only found a different tool to support the traditional
nuclear family consisting of a husband and wife who cannot conceive the
child on their own. 140 This replacement is consistent with the legislative
intent to protect the role of the father by including under the UPA the
presumed father provision granting parental status to husbands who are not
"natural" fathers. 4 1 The Johnson court ruled in favor of the genetic mother
who was married, creating a presumption that because she intended to be
the mother, she would also be the better mother.
142
136. Miller, supra note 4, at 663.
137. Johnson, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 500.
138. Robson, Third Parties and the Third Sex, supra note 18, at 1390.
139. Miller, supra note 4, at 670-72.
140. See Dolgin, supra note 76, at 1286-87 (arguing that the notion of intent used by
the court in Johnson was designed to preserve the traditional understanding of the natural
connection on which the family is based making the intent productive of familial
connections. In essence, the court did nothing more than replace the assumption of the
traditional family in case of the blood connection with a new assumption of traditional
family with intent as a foundation.).
141. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611 (West 2004).
142. Johnson, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 500.
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The case of KM is factually different from Johnson because K.M. is
the unmarried genetic mother who, jointly with her partner, decided and
participated in the creation of her family and acted as a parent to her
children for the six years after they were born, clearly establishing a
socially recognized parent-child relationship. In Johnson, neither Crispina
nor Anna had any other relationship to the child other than biological: one
was the gestational and the other was the genetic mother. The issue was
being resolved before the child was born, while the issue in KM was being
resolved when the children were six years of age and the parental
relationship between the genetic mother and the children was already well
established. Unlike Anna in the Johnson case, who contracted her services
with the Calverts in exchange for $10,000, K.M. did not have a surrogacy
agreement or any other contract with E.G. and was not compensated for
donating her eggs. Also unlike Anna, who was a stranger to the Calverts
before she contracted with them and became their adversary during her
pregnancy, K.M. had a long-term familial relationship with the recipient of
her eggs. This relationship was acknowledged by the court: "For the next
five years, E.G. and K.M. and the twins continued to live together as a
family unit.' 43 Unlike Anna, who was a third party and had no existing
relationship with the Calverts before the birth in Johnson,144 K.M. was not
a third party and had a legally recognized relationship with her partner.
These differences were entirely ignored by the court in K.M
The court in K.M used intent in the same fashion in which it was used
in Johnson, by applying it to preserve the concept of the traditional family
that allows only for one mother: here the one who bore the child. Had the
court not disregarded K.M.'s explicit oral and implied intent to create the
family and the subsequent conduct confirming that intent, it would have
found in favor of K.M., a genetic mother who, just like genetic mother
Crispina, intended to create and bring up the children as her own. The
inequality of treatment is unjustified considering the fact that the Johnson
court was willing to afford parental status to a married genetic mother
before the child was even born, while the court in KM denied that status to
a genetic mother who raised her children for six years in a legally
recognized relationship. The only difference between the two women is
that K.M. was a lesbian. Both Johnson and K.M are consistent with
traditional court decisions: the Johnson court awarded parentage to the
well-situated Filipina married to a white husband over the Black-Native
American mother, 145 while the K.M court awarded the lesbian birth mother
143. KM., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d. at 141.
144. 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 499 n.8 ("To recognize parental rights in a third party with
whom the Calvert family has had little contact since shortly after the child's birth would
diminish Crispina's role as mother.").
145. Dalton, supra note 44, at 303 (citing Janet Dolgin, Just a Gene; Judicial
Assumptions About Parenthood, 40 UCLA L. REV. 637, 676 (1993)).
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custody over the genetically-related lesbian mother who was neither
married nor gave birth. 146 However, while the court in Johnson based its
decision on the intent of the genetic mother to procreate and raise the child,
as evidenced by the surrogacy contract, 147 the court in K.M disregarded the
intent of K.M. to procreate and raise the child and based its decision on the
alleged intent of the birth mother.1
48
By choosing to apply the intent standard without providing a policy-
based justification for its use as a dispositive factor for the determination of
parentage in an assisted reproduction case with a lesbian egg donor, the
court created uncertainty and the potential for confusion in future
applications of the standard. Without establishing clear guidelines as to
whose intent is being reviewed, the exact objective of intent, and what
precise timing of the intent is required, the court embarked on a dangerous
path to disastrous future decisions depriving individuals of their parental
rights and, more importantly, deprive children of their parents.
B. INTENT AS A DETERMINING FACTOR OF PARENTAGE
The subjective and loose intent standard should not have been applied
by the court in KM v. E.G. Once the court determined that K.M. satisfied
the statutory requirement of establishing a mother-child relationship, thus
acquiring the status of a parent, the court should have proceeded with the
best interest of the child standard in solving the issue of custody and
visitation. The court unjustifiably burdened K.M. with an additional
standard devised to solve the custody dispute between a genetic and
gestational mother in a surrogacy case. As articulated by the dissent in
Johnson, the intent test used as a tie breaker in the determination of
parentage was inappropriate in that case because both the woman who
provided eggs and the woman who gave birth had "substantial claims to
legal motherhood."'' 49 Even in Johnson, the court should have proceeded
with the best interest of the child analysis after it determined that both
women satisfied the statutory definition of mother.
The concept of intent is not incorporated as a determinative factor in
any provision of the California JPA.' 50 Although words of consent appear
in provisions about the presumption of fatherhood and the artificial
insemination of a married woman, there is no intent requirement in any of
the methods of establishing parentage. Judicial use of intent as the ultimate
146. See Dolgin, supra note 76 at 1284 n.74 ("See Appellant's Reply Brief at 4,
Anna J., 286 Cal. Rptr. 369 (No. 6010225) (arguing that class differences between parties
informed trial court decision: 'The trial court's knowledge of the Calverts was essentially
limited to their economic wealth i.e. their ability to afford a new Mercedes Benz automobile
which impressed the trial court.')").
147. 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 500.
148. K.M., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 139.
149. Johnson, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 506 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
150. Id- at 513.
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determinative factor of parentage in assisted reproduction cases is
misplaced because, without clear guidelines on the identification of intent,
the courts will be bound to misapply the test, resulting in inconsistencies
with devastating consequences for parents. 151
The court did not indicate whose intent controls when two women
both qualify as mothers under the UPA and what other factors determine
who prevails if both qualified mothers demonstrate intent. What if neither
qualified mother satisfies the intent requirement? The court assumed that
one party would always be able to demonstrate the presence of intent while
the other would not. The court also neglected to explain what the intent has
to relate to: intent to procreate; intent to raise the children; intent to
procreate and raise the children independently; intent to procreate and raise
children together; intent to procreate and raise the children but not be a
legal mother; or some other intent. It further failed to specify the exact
time when the required intent must be present: prior to conception; at the
conception; during pregnancy; after birth of children; at the time of the
alleged dispute or some combination of all these time periods.
The intent inquiry in Johnson focused on the surrogacy contract
between Anna and Crispina that was negotiated and prepared by an
attorney and signed by both parties. 52  It provided for monetary
compensation of $10,000 to Anna in return for her waiver of parental
rights. 53  Although the court in Johnson did not address the issue of
contract enforcement, it was nevertheless able to consider the parties' intent
based on its nature, reasoning that "'intentions that are voluntarily chosen,
deliberate, express and bargained-for ought presumptively to determine
legal parenthood." 5
4
The K.M case is distinguished because the ovum donor form signed by
K.M. in the hospital was no more than a preprinted medical form providing
for the patient's consent to the procedure. 55 Unlike the surrogacy contract,
this form is not a bargained-for exchange between the donor and provider.
Even more significantly, it does not contain any provision or explicit intent
that E.G. would be the only legal parent of the children. The consent form
concerned the patient-hospital relationship and was not an intended,
voluntarily chosen agreement between the egg donor and recipient. As the
151. Dolgin, supra note 76, at 1274.
152. KM., No. S125643, 2004 WL 2108127 at *21-22, petition for rev. filed (citing
Andrew E. Vorzimer, The Egg Donor and Surrogacy Controversy: Legal Issues
Surrounding Representation of Parties to an Egg Donor and Surrogacy Contract, 21
WHITTIER L. REv. 415, 416 (1999)).
153. Johnson, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 496.
154. Id. at 514 (quoting Marjorie Maguire Schultz, Reproductive Technology and
Intent-Based Parenthood. An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 Wis. L. REv. 297,
323 (1990)).
155. The ovum donor consent form was provided by the U.C.S.F. Medical Center
and was signed by K.M. at the hospital in order to begin the egg retrieval procedure. KM,
13 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 141-42.
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Appellant's Petition for Review points out, the reliance of the KM court
on the egg donor form as evidence of the intent of either K.M. or E.G. "is
inconsistent with public policy."'5 6 K.M. and E.G. did not participate in the
creation of the form, and the form did not reflect their relationship. Thus
the court's conclusion that "[t]he donor consent form confirms that E.G.
was intended to be the natural mother and sole parent, while K.M. was the
ovum donor"' 15 7 was erroneous. Even though K.M. signed the form, it was
entirely inappropriate for her situation because it contained the provision
requiring that she not attempt to discover the identity of the recipient of her
egg,' 58 despite the fact that she had a registered partnership with E.G. and
that the only reason why she was consenting to the egg retrieval was their
joint decision to procreate and raise the children.
The court in its opinion made statements difficult to comprehend,
including: "But evidence that K.M. was E.G.'s domestic partner and helped
raise the children does not preclude a finding that K.M. understood and
agreed that E.G. would be the only parent., 159 If all the evidence leads to
the conclusion that there is a legally recognized long-term relationship
during which two parties jointly procreate and raise children, the basis of
the court's finding remains a mystery. The court never elaborates. The
court also failed to mention any constitutional concerns1 60 arising from the
use of a preprinted egg donor form to waive parental rights without the
representation of an attorney or adequate notice about the implications of
such a waiver even after it concluded that under the UPA, K.M. qualified
for the status of parent.'
61
The court in KM quickly dismissed any inquiry into the oral
agreement between K.M. and E.G. about their intentions regarding the birth
of the child and about raising children together. It accepted the trial court's
156. K.M, No. S125643, 2004 WL 2108127 at *23.
157. K.M, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 148.
158. KM, No. S 125643, 2004 WL 2108127 at 21-23 n.8.
159. K.M, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 148.
160. This case note does not address constitutional issues of nonlegal parents and
children as that would be a separate topic in itself. For a general background on the
discussion of constitutional aspects of custody and visitation cases as applied to lesbian
nonlegal parents, see generally Polikoff, The Impact of Troxel, supra note 5 (analyzing
Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959 (R.I. 2000) and Gestl v. Frederick, 754 A.2d 1087 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 2000); discussing successful cases recognizing de facto parenthood
supported by the ALI Principles affording full parental rights to a parent by estoppel who is
not legally recognized). Polikoff argues that the courts should distinguish lesbian and gay
nonlegal parents from third parties and should afford them parental status while protecting
at the same time parent-child relationship from the intrusion of unwanted strangers.
According to Polikoff, this approach would not be inconsistent with Troxel.; Kyle C. Velte,
Towards Constitutional Recognition of the Lesbian-Parented Family, 26 N.Y.U. REv. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 245 (2000-2001) (articulating constitutional arguments and proposing three
constitutionally-based models for custody, visitation and child support disputes in dissolved
lesbian-parented families). See also Robson, Making Mothers, supra note 11, at 21-23.
161. K.M, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 144.
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finding of intent that E.G. would be the only parent unless and until an
adoption by K.M. occurred 162 The court emphasized that it was irrelevant
whether the oral agreement was enforceable or not and that the
determination of parentage did not rest upon a binding agreement between
K.M. and E.G. 163  Nevertheless, the determination of parentage rested
exclusively on the intent, as the court perceived it, contained in that
agreement. Why one element of something irrelevant may be used as a
determining factor of parentage, entailing constitutionally-protected
interests, depriving a person of her children and children of their mother,
was neither clarified nor justified by the court. The court further
misapplied the intent test by considering the subjective belief of E.G. about
her and her partner's legal status and not whether the parties intended to
conceive and raise the child together. The facts clearly demonstrate that
both parties intended to procreate and to raise the children together, which
they did for six years. The fact that they did not reveal K.M.'s genetic
connection is not inconsistent with the testimony that they agreed to tell the
children eventually when E.G. decided it was appropriate.164 None of this
precludes the conclusion that they intended to create and raise the children
together, and the court does not show any conduct indicating the opposite.
The court prematurely rejected the subsequent conduct of the parties
that clearly demonstrated that K.M. acted as a parent with the full consent
of E.G. Like the teacher who, in the children's story "Heather Has Two
Mommies," 165 told Heather that it is pretty special to have two mommies,
E.G. told the children after they came from school one day inquiring why
they did not have a father, "Aren't you lucky you have two mamas?"
166
Even if E.G. originally did not intend K.M. to be the legal parent, her
subsequent conduct allowing K.M. to fully assume parental duties and
responsibilities and the conveyance of her belief to her children are entirely
inconsistent with that intent. The court is deeply confused by the concept
of intent, not being certain what evidence would suffice to prove it or what
162. Id. at 146.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 140.
165. LESLIA NEWMAN, HEATHER HAS Two MoMMIEs (2d ed., 2000). Together with
MICHAEL WILLHOITE, DADDY'S ROOMMATE (1990), this book enraged the religious and
cultural conservatives who reacted by pursuing various means to ban the book. The
homophobic activities ranged from censorship in school and public libraries to an
amendment proposed by Senator Smith (R-N.H.) on Aug. 1, 1994 to the bill entitled
Improving America's Schools Act of 1993. The purpose of the amendment was "[tlo
prohibit Federal funds for instructional materials, instruction, counseling, or other services
on school grounds, from being used for the promotion of homosexuality as a positive
lifestyle alternative." S.Amdt. 2433 103rd Cong. (1994). A somewhat more detailed
amendment was proposed the same day by Senator Helms (R-N.C.): S. Amdt. 2434 103rd
Cong. (1994). Although the Senate voted in favor of the amendment, measures in the bill
were indefinitely postponed by unanimous consent.
166. KM., No. S125643, 2004 WL 2108127 at *7 n.4.
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impact the conduct of the parties would have on it. It states that subsequent
functioning as a parent could prove the intent at the conception:
We do not mean to imply that the conduct of the parties
after the birth of a child and the parental roles the parties
played have no legal significance. Such evidence would be
relevant to confirm or refute proof of the parties' parentage
intentions at conception under the Johnson test.
1 67
If the court adhered to this proposition it would conclude that K.M.'s
conduct at the time of conception and subsequent to the birth of the
children demonstrated that she functioned fully as a parent, which would in
turn prove her intent to be a parent at conception. Further, if the court
strictly applied the Johnson rule it would have to find that but for K.M.'s
intention there would be no children. 68 Instead, the court concluded that
"[t]he method available to K.M. for acquiring parental rights was
adoption."' 69 This reasoning merely begs the question why a person who
was determined by the court to be the natural mother of the child would
need to use adoption to obtain parental rights that are automatically
conferred to those who satisfy a statutory requirement and remained
unaddressed by the court.
The court also declined to consider K.M. as a co-parent. In rejecting
functional parenting, the court cited Nancy S. for the proposition that the
status of the de facto parent does not make a natural parent under the UPA.
The court concluded accordingly that K.M. could not acquire the status of
natural mother by functioning in a parental role, 170 seeming to forget that as
a threshold, the court decided the question of standing based on K.M.'s
qualification as a natural mother for the purposes of the UPA.
The uncritical following of the Johnson court is an example of how an
unsupported statement becomes internalized and unchallenged by
subsequent decisions as something that logically flows from the
assumptions of natural law so deeply embedded in the law. The Johnson
court stated that "for any child California law recognizes only one natural
mother"'17 1 without citing any supporting authority. 172  Relying on that
167. KM, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3dat 152 n.13.
168. See Johnson, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 500 (examining the Calverts' intent, the court
concluded: "They affirmatively intended the birth of the child, and took steps, necessary to
effect in vitro fertilization. But for their acted-on intention, the child would not exist.").
169. K.M., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 152.
170. Id.
171. Johnson, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 499.
172. The court's statement, unsupported by statute, case law or any other authority
resembles Justice Scalia's statement in Michael H., proffering natural law as the starting
point of his legal analysis: "California law, like nature itself, makes no provision for dual
fatherhood." MichaelH., 491 U.S. at 118.
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statement, the KM court was forced to find another way of balancing the
parental interests of two women who are both natural mothers. The dissent
in Johnson explained the problem:
Faced with the failure of current statutory law to
adequately address the issue of who is a child's natural
mother when two women qualify under the UPA, the
majority breaks the 'tie' by resort to a criterion not found
in the UPA - the 'intent' of the genetic mother to be the
child's mother.'
73
The case of KM was a unique opportunity for the court to break the
traditional approach to parenting based on the nuclear family consisting of
a mother and father. Where the interest of the state is in finding two
parents for the child whenever possible, and when the statutory provisions
are applied in a gender-neutral manner, it follows logically that two women
who are both "natural" mothers (by virtue of genetics or giving birth) are
also both legal mothers according to the law. Once the court found that
K.M. qualified as a "natural" mother under the UPA, the next step was to
apply the best interest of the child standard in determining custody and
visitation rights. The court's assumption of single motherhood as the
normative and only acceptable model led the court to impose the double
threshold for establishing parentage for lesbian mothers, which amounts to
gender-based discrimination. The courts do not impose the intent standard
in a child custody dispute where a sperm donor claims parental status.
1 74
They do not impose such a standard where two men, one of which is
genetic father, are involved in a custody dispute. The California statutory
scheme specifically provides:
If the natural father or a man representing himself to be the
natural father claims parental rights, the court shall
determine if he is the father. The court shall then
determine if it is in the best interest of the child that the
father retain his parental rights, or that an adoption of the
child be allowed to proceed.'
75
Considering that the UPA provisions applicable to the father and child
relationship apply to the mother and child relationship, 76 the best interest
of the child was required to follow the determination of K.M. as a natural
173. Johnson, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 513 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
174. See generally Miller, supra note 4, at 643-58 (discussing the establishment of
paternity under the California statutory scheme).
175. CAL. FAM. CODE §7611 (d) (West 2004).
176. Id. § 7650.
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mother. The different treatment of a lesbian genetic mother in this case is
unjustified, and K.M. should have challenged it.
However, that is not what K.M. is arguing in her appeal to the Supreme
Court of California.177  Instead of denouncing the intent standard and
arguing for the recognition of two mothers, the petition argues that K.M. is
a presumed parent under California Family Code § 7611(d) Status of
Natural Father; Presumptions; Conditions.
C. PRESUMPTION OF PARENTAGE
Another erroneous part of the decision in KM was the court's
rationale for rejecting the presumption of parentage claim. Because K.M.
established that she qualified as a natural mother, the court said she need
not rely on the claim of presumption of fatherhood under Family Code §
7611 (d).' 78 This section creates an evidentiary presumption of paternity
for a man when "[h]e receives the child into his home and openly holds out
the child as his natural child.' ' 179 The court in Johnson clearly said the
UPA must be applied in a gender-neutral way where the language of the
statute uses the gender-specific language.' 80 Applying this principle, the
court in KM analogized K.M.'s status under the ovum donor consent form
with a sperm donor status under the UPA, concluding that the two were
consistent.18' However, the court refused to apply the same principle to
find consistency between K.M.'s conduct and the presumption of
fatherhood requirement under the Family Code § 7611 (d). Even assuming,
arguendo, that the court was right that K.M. needed not invoke this section,
she was certainly entitled by law to do that and the court was obligated to
address her claim. Similarly, the court manipulated the fact that K.M. was
a natural mother under the UPA: on the one hand conferring standing, and
on the other, precluding her claim under the presumption of parenthood.
Not allowing K.M.'s claim to proceed under Family Code § 761 l(d) was a
clear error of law and it was erroneously justified by the court's finding of
distinction between the concept of "receiving a child into one's home as
one's own child" and "cohabiting with the child's mother and welcoming
the mother's child."'I 2 Clearly, K.M. received her own children since she
177. The Appellant's Petition for Review relied on the analysis of the Johnson case
in Emily Doskow, The Second Parent Trap: Parenting for Same-Sex Couples in a Brave
New World, 20 J. Juv. L. 1, 16-19 (1999). The Petition followed the usual pattern of trying
to fit the arguments into a legal framework that refuses to recognize the existence of lesbian
families.
178. K.M, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 151.
179. CAL. FAM. CODE § 761 1(d) (West 2004).
180. Johnson, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 498 ("provisions applicable to the father and child
relationship apply in an action to determine the existence or nonexistence of a mother and
child relationship. (CIV. CODE, § 7015.)").
181. K.M, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 148.
182. K.M, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 151 (citing Miller v. Miller, 64 Cal. App. 4th 111, 118
(1998)). In Miller a woman with three children divorced her husband and married his
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was undisputedly their natural mother, having proven genetic
consanguinity.
The analogy with a sperm donor in K.M was inappropriate. The court
was ready to analogize the status of K.M. as an ovum donor to the status of
a sperm donor under the UPA in respect to the waiver of parental rights on
the donor consent form, but failed to discuss why the same analogy would
not apply in the parentage claim had K.M. been a sperm donor to his
unmarried partner who gave birth to the child conceived with his sperm.
As pointed out by Polikoff in her comment about the case: "the court would
have no trouble saying that child has one mother and one father, regardless
of what the couple initially decided. Courts are focused on that model and
go to great lengths to enforce it.'
' 83
The unnecessary and humiliating judicial analogy between a lesbian
mother and a presumed father is a typical example of an attempt of the
majority to impose its own views and forcibly assimilate or domesticate
those who do not fit within the parameters of the dominant legal regime.
Lesbian advocates must resist the temptation of using the oppressing legal
regime's tools to achieve immediate goals at the expense of long term
gender and sexual equality.
D. BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD
The best interest of the child should have been applied in K.M to
resolve the custody and visitation dispute between former lesbian partners
who both qualified as mothers under the UPA. Ironically, in denying K.M.
her parental rights, the court concluded:
We join the trial court in recognizing the harsh
consequences of this decision for the children in this case,
who will suffer significantly from the inability of the
parties to agree on sharing their parental roles. As the trial
court found, the interests of the children will be 'disserved'
by the loss of a loving mother figure.
84
In criticizing the court's application of the intent concept to determine
parentage, dissenting Justice Kennard pointed out:
brother. The first husband was a legal parent of the last child until two years later when he
was told that his brother was actually the parent of that child. The mother filed a claim
seeking to establish that the second husband is the parent of the child under the presumption
of fatherhood. The court refused to entertain the claim because the second father waited
four years after he was told he was the father to establish paternity and accepted the child
support for that child from the first husband during that period without any objection.
Miller, 64 Cal. App. 4th at 118. The Miller case is inapposite to K.M. and does not support
the K.M court's justification for refusing to apply the presumption provision.
183. Orenstein, supra note 2, at 29 (quoting Nancy Polikoff).
184. K.M, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 153-54.
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[W]e are deciding the fate of a child. In the absence of
legislation that is designed to address the unique problems
of gestational surrogacy, this court should look not to tort,
property or contract law, but to family law, as the
governing paradigm and source of a rule of decision. The
allocation of parental rights and responsibilities necessarily
impacts the welfare of a minor child. And in issues of child
welfare, the standard that courts frequently apply is the
best interest of the child." 5
The court in KM relied on dicta in a Johnson footnote, 186 where the court
stated that the determination of parentage must precede and should not be
dictated by the custody decision, to reject the best interest of the child
standard. The Johnson court did not provide a citation for this proposition,
but instead based it on the fear that the split custody between the natural
father and the gestator (if recognized as the natural mother) in that
particular case would not benefit the child.187  Although the court in
Johnson argued that it was not appropriate to use the best interest of the
child in the determination of parentage, it failed to show why it was
appropriate to use the intent test. Since custody determination directly
follows the parentage decision, the logical connection of these two
interconnected issues is obvious. There is nothing in the UPA that
precludes the use of the best interest of the child to determine parentage.
Moreover, the best interest of the child standard is expressly included in the
UPA under various other provisions l1 8 while intent is not.
18 9
Most of the courts recognize that the child's best interests are a policy
goal and not a strict standard with definite rules to fit every case. 90
Devastating are the implications of the decision to deny parental rights to
the lesbian mother who is not only genetically related to the children but
has been their caretaker for the first six years of their lives. They are
entirely inconsistent with the policy goals of the state to promote the
welfare of children.
The counsel for K.M. does not argue the denial of the best interest of
the child standard in their Petition for Review. Taking for granted that the
courts reserve it for custody and visitation disputes only, the appellant
tacitly approves the majority's assumptions, which have no grounds in
185. Johnson, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 517 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
186. K.M, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 154 (quoting Johnson, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 500 n.10).
187. Johnson, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 500 n.10.
188. Id. at 517 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
189. Id. at 513.
190. Katharine T. Bartlett, U.S. Custody Law and Trends in the Context of the ALl
Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, 10 VA. J. SoC. POL'Y & L. 5, 15-16 (2002).
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statutes or common law. While arguing that the children had no control
over the way their family was created and only know that they have two
mothers, the Petition avoids the language of the best interest standard to
describe the devastating tragic impact that the loss of one mother will have
on them.'
91
The court in K.M. erred in not applying the best interest of the child
standard in this case because once the natural mother status of K.M. was
established, the custody and visitation issues were the next to be resolved.
While the advocates of nontraditional family rights include intent as an
approach to solving parentage disputes between lesbian parents, it is clear
that the intent must not be the determinative factor considered in
isolation. 1
92
V. CONCLUSION
The paramount policy goal of resolving parentage and custody disputes
is the same: protecting the best interests of the child. If the Supreme Court
of California allows the intent test to remain the dispositive factor in
solving disputes between lesbian parents it will do an enormous injustice to
children from lesbian families as well as lesbian parents who are not
recognized by the law. The courts will be left without any clear guidelines
on the application of the test and the underlying public policies and
subsequently will create inconsistencies and confusion that will result in
harsh consequences for children and parents in lesbian families. As the
case of KM demonstrates, the only way to achieve equal treatment for
lesbian parents is to challenge the underlying assumptions of the existing
legal regime, founded on the heterosexist social model whose goal is to
foster and preserve the majority's traditional moral views. Whether there
could be two mothers, one genetic and the other gestational, in California
depends on the willingness of the lesbians to challenge the current
discriminatory legal system.
191. K.M, No. S125643, 2004 WL 2108127 at *7-8.
192. See Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers, supra note 5, at 491 (arguing
that in their development of the new definition of parenthood the courts should focus on
what would best serve the interest of children by using two criteria: a person's performance
of parental functions and the child's view of that person. Additionally the court may look at
the actions and intent of the legal parents in creating an additional parental relationship).
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